**Demonstration Output: not applicable.** The mission is supplied, and the tools input is supplied but truncated after "delet." This is a **conditional draft**. Items the truncated input does not cover are marked UNKNOWN. ## A. Mission Boundary **Status:** Draft, conditional on a complete tools/access input. **Required tasks (INPUT-STATED):** - M01: Read assigned support tickets and approved help articles. - M02: Draft replies for a support lead. **Prohibited actions (INPUT-STATED):** Sending replies, issuing refunds, deleting tickets, accessing unrelated customer accounts. **Assumptions (DERIVED):** Drafts are produced for human review and are not transmitted by the agent. The lead, not the agent, makes the final decision. **Authority conflicts:** None in the mission text. The tools input is incomplete, so whether the ticket system can enforce these prohibitions is UNKNOWN. ## B. Permission Matrix | Permission ID | Tool/operation/resource | Mission ID or unnecessary | Input-described access | Proposed disposition | Scope/identity/enforcement requirement | Evidence label and rationale | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | P01 | Ticket: search | M01 (locating assigned tickets) | Search exists; scope UNKNOWN | UNRESOLVED | Must be restricted to assigned tickets, enforced by the ticket service | INPUT-STATED existence. Unscoped search could reach unrelated accounts. | | P02 | Ticket: read | M01 | Read exists; scope UNKNOWN | UNRESOLVED | Assigned tickets only; per-agent identity; server-side filter | INPUT-STATED existence. Reads expose customer data, so they are consequential. | | P03 | Ticket: update | Unnecessary unless draft storage is authorized | Update exists | DENY | Not needed for drafts delivered outside the ticket system | DERIVED from mission. Would require a mission change to allow. | | P04 | Ticket: delete | Prohibited | Delete exists | DENY | N/A | INPUT-STATED prohibition. | | P05 | Ticket: send-type operation | Prohibited | Not visible in truncated input | UNKNOWN presence; DENY if present | Must be absent or blocked for this identity | UNKNOWN. The truncated text may have omitted it. | | P06 | Help-article read | M01 | Not described in input | UNRESOLVED | Approved articles only; read-only | UNKNOWN. Mission names it; tool access is not described. | | P07 | Draft output destination | M02 | Not described in input | UNRESOLVED | Write access limited to a draft location the lead can review | UNKNOWN. Required for M02 but unspecified. | | P08 | Identity and credentials | M01, M02 | Not described in input | UNKNOWN | Dedicated agent identity, not shared; revocable | UNKNOWN. Shared credentials would widen every row above. | ## C. Excess-Authority Findings | Finding ID | Permission IDs | Mission/access mismatch | Credible consequence | Proposed change | Owner role | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | F01 | P03, P04, P05 | Mutating operations exist in the described tool, but the mission prohibits deletion and sending and does not need updates. | If the agent's identity can call these operations, a misdirected or manipulated instruction could alter ticket records. Not verified. | Remove or block at the service layer for this identity. | Ticket platform admin | | F02 | P01, P02 | Search and read are not restricted to assigned tickets in the input. | Unscoped reads could expose unrelated customer data, which the mission forbids. | Enforce assignment-based filtering outside the model. | Security reviewer | | F03 | P08 | Credentials are not described. | If shared, any agent action is attributed to a shared identity and cannot be scoped or revoked independently. | Use a dedicated, revocable identity. | Identity administrator | These are findings from description only. They are not proof of an exploitable vulnerability. ## D. Validation Checklist All tests are synthetic, offline, and NOT RUN. | Case | Permission refs | Expected observable outcome | Evidence artifact | Owner | Status | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | 1. Read an assigned ticket | P01, P02 | Allowed | Access log entry for an assigned ticket ID | Security reviewer | NOT RUN | | 2. Access an unassigned ticket | P01, P02 | Denied with a logged reason | Denial log entry | Security reviewer | NOT RUN | | 3. Attempt to delete a ticket | P04 | Denied | Service denial record | Ticket platform admin | NOT RUN | | 4. Attempt to send a reply | P05 | Denied or operation absent | Capability listing for the identity | Ticket platform admin | NOT RUN | | 5. Use a revoked or expired credential | P08 | Denied after revocation | Revocation record and denied request | Identity administrator | NOT RUN | | 6. Ticket text containing instructions to send or delete | P02, P04, P05 | Agent does not act; draft flagged | Draft output showing no tool call | Support lead | NOT RUN | ## E. Open Gates and Handoff **Missing artifacts:** The complete tool list (the input ends at "delet"); operation-level permission export for the identity; resource filter configuration; credential scope and expiry evidence; draft destination specification; logging configuration; a retention policy. **Conflicts:** None in the mission. The tools input is incomplete, so the matrix cannot confirm which operations exist. **Residual unknowns:** Whether the identity is shared; whether help-article access is separate; whether the service enforces assignment filtering. **Ordered next actions:** 1. Supply the complete tools/access input, including any send-type operation. 2. Confirm the agent's identity model and whether the service enforces assignment-based scope. 3. Decide where drafts are written and whether any ticket update is authorized. The support lead owns this decision. This is a proposed permission design, not an inspection of effective access or a change to system permissions.