Prompt Details
Model
(claude-5-5-sonnet)
Token size
3,228
Example input
[PEOPLE_SYSTEM_INTERACTIONS]: P1: Recruitment Officer uses an AI applicant-ranking system to shortlist candidates. Can accept recommendations but cannot view excluded candidates. P2: HR Supervisor approves hiring decisions. P3: System Administrator manages ranking settings. Affected groups: job applicants.
[EVIDENCE_AND_POLICY]: R1, access snapshot: P1 can accept rankings; P2 has approval access; P3 can edit ranking thresholds. R2, policy clause 3: candidate rejection requires supervisor approval. R3, configuration record: rejected candidates are automatically removed from the queue after 15 minutes. No approval-enforcement log or intervention-time study supplied.
Example output
# People–System Interaction Assessment and Human Oversight Report
## 1. Executive finding
**Status:** Real input; no sample facts used. Pseudonyms P1–P3 are as supplied. Evidence R1–R3 are as supplied. I assigned E1 (the people/system field) and E2 (the closing sentence of the evidence field).
**Objectives:** (1) an evidence-bound judgment of each interaction, (2) one justified priority per person, (3) a scenario test of whether the proposed controls make each interaction workable.
**Main finding:**
- Observed R3: rejected candidates leave the queue after 15 minutes.
- Observed R2 clause 3: rejection requires supervisor approval.
- R3 does not say whether removal waits for approval. The two records may conflict, but that is Unknown until the rule logic and an enforcement log are supplied.
- Observed E2: no approval-enforcement log or intervention-time study was supplied. This is a scope limit, not proof of a missing control.
- Legal applicability: Not assessed.
**HITL** (human-in-the-loop) means a person who can meaningfully check, correct, approve or stop a system action before it takes effect.
## 2. People–interaction register
| Person / interaction | System and activity | Permission and consequence | Tier and evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 Recruitment Officer / I1 | Observed E1 P1 sentence 1: shortlists candidates using AI ranking system | Observed R1 P1 entry: accepts rankings. Applicants progress or stall [n1] | Inferred: L2, reliance on outputs; E1 P1 sentence 1; volume Unknown |
| P2 HR Supervisor / I2 | Observed E1 P2: approves hiring decisions | Observed R1 P2 entry: approval access, scope Unknown. Applicants' outcomes [n2] | Observed: approves consequential actions, L2; E1 P2, R1 P2 entry |
| P3 System Administrator / I3 | Observed E1 P3: manages ranking settings | Observed R1 P3 entry: edits ranking thresholds. Affects all rankings [n3] | Observed: configures rules, L2; E1 P3, R1 P3 entry |
- **n1:** Affected group is job applicants (Observed E1 affected groups). Observed E1 P1 sentence 2: P1 cannot view excluded candidates.
- **n2:** Observed E1 P2 says "hiring decisions," while Observed R2 clause 3 requires approval of *rejections*. Whether P2 is the designated supervisor under R2 is Unknown.
- **n3:** Whether P3's edits need approval is Unknown. R2 supplies only clause 3.
## 2a. Domain–layer entitlement matrix
| Person / entitlement | Domain / operational layer | Resource / effective action | Evidence / conditions |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 / G1 | HR recruitment; Application/workspace (Inferred) | Ranking system; accept rankings | Observed R1 P1 entry; effectiveness Unknown [n4] |
| P2 / G2 | HR recruitment; Application/workspace (Inferred) | Approval function; object scope Unknown | Observed R1 P2 entry; scope Unknown [n4] |
| P3 / G3 | HR recruitment; Identity/control administration (Inferred: rule configuration) | Ranking thresholds; edit | Observed R1 P3 entry; approval condition Unknown [n4] |
- **n4:** Missing for all grants: account mapping, environment/tenant, object scope, access path (direct, group, inherited, delegated), validity or activation, restrictions or denies, and usage records. R1 is an access snapshot, so assigned versus effective rights are Unknown.
- **Identity:** no identity is merged or linked across pseudonyms.
## 2b. Per-person privilege nexus
| Person / linked entitlements | Connected capability / consequence | Status and evidence | Independent control / HITL |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 / G1 | Accept ranking, then candidate leaves or progresses | No connected path evidenced within P1's own rights; R1 P1 entry | Unknown; reviewer for excluded candidates not evidenced |
| P2 / G2 | Approve; possible ability to alter thresholds or logs unevidenced | No connected path evidenced; independence Unknown (R1 P2 entry only) | Unknown; P2's complete linked rights not supplied |
| P3 / G3 | Edit thresholds, which change rankings P1 relies on | Potential path: P3's approver and change log Unknown (R1 P3 entry) | Not demonstrated; P3 must not approve own changes (Proposed) |
| Cross-person flow G3→G1→G2 | Threshold edit, ranking, acceptance, R3 removal, approval | Potential path: R3 trigger and P2's role unverified (R3, R2 clause 3) | Contain pending control (Proposed) |
- **Cross-person flow:** this is a dependency across three people, not a separation-of-duties conflict, since no person holds the full chain.
- **Usage:** no usage or transaction records were supplied, so no execution is evidenced.
- **Absence:** "no connected path evidenced" does not mean any person is safe.
- **Missing domains and links:** other domains, service accounts, group membership and logging rights.
## 3. Exposure and operating conditions
| Interaction | Security exposure | Operational exposure | Evidence / unknowns |
|---|---|---|---|
| I1 | Unknown; no access concern evidenced | Inferred: P1 cannot check exclusions before acting on rankings | Insufficient evidence; E1 P1 sentence 2; volume Unknown |
| I2 | Unknown whether approval can be bypassed or altered | Inferred: removal at 15 minutes may precede approval; reversibility Unknown | Priority treatment; R3, R2 clause 3; E2 |
| I3 | Inferred: unauthorised or unreviewed threshold alteration | Inferred: one setting error propagates to every applicant ranking | Priority treatment; R1 P3 entry; change log Unknown |
- **Sensitivity:** applicant data sensitivity is Unknown.
- **Treatment labels:** Priority treatment, Routine review and Insufficient evidence are descriptive. No score or residual-risk assurance is given.
## 4. HITL requirements
| Interaction | Mode and trigger | Human role and intervention | Basis / current evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| I1 | Review before use; each ranking acceptance | P1 reviews; needs excluded-candidate access or a designated reviewer | Proposed; Gap observed: E1 P1 sentence 2; oversight Not demonstrated |
| I2 | Contain pending control; each queued rejection | P2 (if designated) approves; authority to stop removal | Required by R2 clause 3; containment Proposed; enforcement Not demonstrated (E2) |
| I3 | Approve before effect; each threshold change | Independent system owner approves; P3 cannot self-approve | Proposed safeguard; no supplied clause; Unknown; Not demonstrated |
- **Evidence access and alternatives:** Not demonstrated. E1 P1 sentence 2 shows P1 cannot see excluded candidates.
- **Authority and time:** authority to stop removal, and capacity to decide within 15 minutes, are Not demonstrated (R3, E2).
- **Logs:** decision and override logs are Not demonstrated.
- **Fallback (Proposed):** a manual route holding queue removal until an approval record exists.
- **Containment:** the interim protection for I2 is not implemented or authorised by this report.
## 5. Capability and organisational support
| Person / interaction | Capability evidence | Organisational gap | One priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 / I1 | Unknown: no competence or review-time evidence (E2) | Observed: no view of excluded candidates (E1 P1 sentence 2) | System design plus evidence collection; see note |
| P2 / I2 | Unknown: no competence or workload evidence (E2) | Unknown: gate enforcement, capacity within 15 minutes (R3, E2) | Governance and system design; see note |
| P3 / I3 | Unknown: no competence evidence supplied | Unknown: change approval policy and change log not supplied | Governance and permissions; see note |
- **P1:** owner is the system owner (Proposed). First action: confirm how exclusions can be reviewed.
- **P2 (highest overall priority):** owner is the system owner with HR leadership (Proposed). First action: obtain the R3 rule logic and approval-enforcement log. It ranks highest because rejection affects applicants directly and R2 and R3 may conflict.
- **P3:** owner is the system owner (Proposed). First action: obtain threshold-change history and approver records.
- **Training:** missing competence evidence does not show personal incompetence. Evidence supports no training need yet.
## 6. Verification and reassessment
| Priority / owner | Scenario test | Pass evidence | Stop / review trigger |
|---|---|---|---|
| P2: gate enforcement; system owner | Proposed: queue a test rejection with no approval; observe minute 15 | Proposed: candidate held; approver can act; override logged | Proposed: any removal without approval record |
| P1: exclusion review; system owner | Proposed: test exclusion; P1 or reviewer requests review within window | Proposed: reasons visible; correction route works; decision logged | Proposed: reviewer cannot see or reverse exclusion |
| P3: change control; system owner | Proposed: submit test threshold change by P3 | Proposed: independent approval precedes effect; change logged | Proposed: change effective without independent approval |
- **No tests have run.** All thresholds are Proposed.
- **Applicants:** preserve and verify a correction or appeal route for applicants (Unknown whether one exists).
- **Reassess** after changes to duties, access, ranking rules or thresholds, scale, incidents, or affected groups.
- **Next evidence packet:** R3 rule logic, an approval-enforcement and removal-event log for a defined period, and group/role membership for P1–P3.
## Evidence key
- **E1:** people/system field (P1, P2 and P3 entries; affected groups)
- **E2:** closing sentence of the evidence field (no enforcement log or intervention-time study)
- **R1:** access snapshot (Observed content, not verified truth)
- **R2:** policy clause 3 (required practice, not proof of implementation)
- **R3:** configuration record (15-minute automatic removal)
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CLAUDE-5-5-SONNET
Assess how people interact with AI and business systems. Map permissions, connected privileges, operational risks, and human oversight requirements using evidence-linked analysis. Generate interaction assessments, cross-system access reviews, prioritized safeguards, and scenario-based verification plans. Designed for governance, security, compliance, and operational assurance teams.
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