## Phase 1: Supply Chain Context Reconstruction Objective: Map how source code becomes a production application. GitHub Source Repository npm Dependency Resolution package.json + package-lock.json GitHub Actions Build and Tests Workflow security not yet verified Docker Image Creation and Publication Image provenance and signing unknown Production Deployment Deployment controls require verification Findings: - Confirmed by the test input: Node.js, TypeScript, GitHub, npm, GitHub Actions, and Docker are part of the described architecture. - Evidence-supported observation: A lockfile is committed. - Unknown: Dependency versions, workflow permissions, registry restrictions, signing policy, and deployment identity. - Potential risk: A weakness in dependency resolution or the build pipeline could affect the delivered application. Priority action: Obtain the actual repository, workflow files, and deployment configuration before assigning confirmed findings. ## Phase 2: Dependency Inventory and Graph Reconstruction Objective: Identify direct and transitive dependencies and trace their origins. | Component | Evidence available | Audit status | | ----------------------- | ---------------------------- | -------------------------- | | Node.js | Application description | Confirmed in test input | | TypeScript | Application description | Confirmed in test input | | npm packages | `package.json` exists | Package identities unknown | | Transitive dependencies | No package contents supplied | Unknown | | Docker base image | Docker image used | Name and digest unknown | | GitHub Actions | CI/CD system identified | Individual actions unknown | Illustrative dependency graph: ``` E-commerce Application ├── Direct npm dependencies │ └── Transitive npm dependencies ├── Build tools ├── GitHub Actions └── Docker base image └── Operating system packages ``` Risk analysis: - A committed lockfile improves dependency reproducibility when the build uses it correctly. - A lockfile does not prove that packages are safe or that the registry and build environment are trusted. - Unpinned build actions or mutable container tags could introduce unexpected changes if present. Result: Inventory incomplete. Obtain the manifests, lockfile, Dockerfile, and workflow definitions. ## Phase 3: Vulnerability and Exposure Analysis Objective: Establish whether known vulnerabilities affect the project. | Check | Result | | ------------------------- | ------------------ | | Known CVEs and advisories | Not assessed | | Affected package versions | Unknown | | Fixed versions | Unknown | | Runtime reachability | Unknown | | Exploit preconditions | Unknown | | Vulnerability scan | No report supplied | Finding VUL-01 — Dependency vulnerability exposure cannot be determined - Severity: Unverified - Confidence: High that evidence is missing; no conclusion about actual vulnerabilities. - Impact: An affected, reachable dependency could enable data exposure, service disruption, or unauthorized execution, depending on the vulnerability. - Remediation: Generate an npm dependency inventory and run a vulnerability scan against current advisory data. - Verification: Review affected version ranges, dependency paths, runtime usage, and applicable fixes. No CVE or vulnerable package can responsibly be declared from the supplied input alone. ## Phase 4: Dependency Trust and Package Source Audit Objective: Assess how third-party packages enter the application. Checks required: - Verify npm registry configuration and approved package sources. - Inspect lockfile integrity metadata and dependency URL origins. - Review version constraints and unexplained package changes. - Check private package namespace protections against dependency confusion. - Investigate suspicious naming or ownership changes using supporting evidence. - Remove unnecessary dependencies only after assessing their usage. Finding PKG-01 — Package source trust is unverified - Severity: Unverified. - Risk mechanism: If package resolution can be redirected to an untrusted source, a malicious package could enter the build. - Confidence: High that the relevant configuration was not supplied; no evidence of an actual attack. - Recommended control: Enforce approved registries, namespace protections, and lockfile-based installation. - Verification: Review registry settings and test package resolution in a controlled environment. ## Phase 5: SBOM, Provenance and Traceability Objective: Establish which components are included in each release and where the release originated. Illustrative findings: - SBOM-01: SBOM availability is unknown. No SBOM was supplied. - PROV-01: Build provenance is unknown. No attestation was supplied. - SIG-01: Artifact signature verification is unknown. Recommended controls: 1. Generate an SBOM for each release using an appropriate standard, such as CycloneDX or SPDX. 2. Record the source revision, build identity, dependency information, and artifact digest. 3. Generate and verify provenance attestations. 4. Sign release artifacts and enforce trusted signer identity and policy during deployment. Verification: Confirm that the SBOM corresponds to the actual release artifact and that provenance links the artifact to the expected source and trusted build process. An SBOM documents components; it does not prove that they are vulnerability-free. ## Phase 6: Build System and CI/CD Integrity Objective: Determine whether the build pipeline can be trusted. Finding CICD-01 — Workflow security cannot be assessed The workflow YAML files were not provided. Potential concerns to investigate: - Excessive workflow token permissions. - Third-party actions referenced by mutable tags. - Untrusted pull-request code accessing sensitive credentials. - Build and release jobs sharing unnecessary privileges. - Deployment without approval or provenance checks. Recommended controls: - Apply least-privilege workflow permissions. - Pin third-party actions to verified commit SHAs where appropriate. - Isolate untrusted pull-request builds from release credentials. - Restrict production deployment to trusted branches and approved environments. - Validate the provenance and identity of release artifacts. Verification: Inspect workflow YAML, branch protection settings, job permissions, runner configuration, and release logs. Test the controls in a non-production environment. ## Phase 7: Secrets, Identity and Access Control Objective: Review credentials used by the application build and deployment process. Evidence status: No secret configuration, identity policies, or credential audit was supplied. Potential risks to investigate: - Long-lived deployment tokens. - Excessive repository or cloud permissions. - Signing keys accessible to untrusted jobs. - Secrets exposed through logs or build artifacts. - Missing credential rotation procedures. Remediation plan: - Use least privilege and short-lived credentials where supported. - Prefer workload identity for supported cloud integrations. - Separate build, publishing, and deployment identities. - Restrict access to signing keys. - Rotate credentials if exposure is confirmed. Verification: Review permission policies and secret-scanning results. Never print actual secret values in the audit report. ## Phase 8: Container, Artifact and Release Integrity Objective: Determine whether the production image is the artifact that was intended and approved for release. Finding ART-01 — Docker artifact integrity controls are unknown Checks required: - Identify the Docker base image and pin it to an appropriate digest. - Scan operating system and application dependencies. - Review image registry access permissions. - Verify image signatures and provenance. - Deploy the approved image digest rather than resolving a mutable tag at deployment time. - Retain release metadata and rollback artifacts. Impact: If artifact integrity controls are inadequate, a modified or unintended image could potentially reach production. Verification: Compare the approved build digest with the deployed digest and verify the signing identity and provenance policy. This is a control gap requiring investigation, not proof that an image has been tampered with. ## Phase 9: Supply Chain Risk Scoring and Prioritization Objective: Prioritize risks based on evidence, exposure, and potential impact rather than inventing numerical probabilities. | Risk | Preliminary priority | Reason | | ----------------------------------- | ----------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------- | | Unknown CI/CD permissions | High investigation priority | Pipeline may have access to release credentials | | Unknown dependency vulnerabilities | High investigation priority | Actual exposure has not been assessed | | Unknown artifact provenance | High investigation priority | Release origin cannot yet be verified | | Unknown package source restrictions | Medium investigation priority | Dependency origin controls are unverified | | Unknown SBOM availability | Medium investigation priority | Component traceability is not established | These are investigation priorities, not confirmed severity ratings. No evidence currently justifies a confirmed Critical or High vulnerability finding. Prioritization rule: Escalate a finding when evidence demonstrates a realistic attack path, sensitive privileges, meaningful production exposure, or a severe applicable vulnerability. ## Phase 10: Risk Propagation and Blast-Radius Analysis Objective: Understand how a potential weakness could spread through the delivery chain. Hypothetical scenario A Untrusted dependency enters the build Package source → Dependency resolution → Build execution → Application artifact → Potential production impact Required conditions: An untrusted component is resolved, its behavior is relevant to the build or application, and applicable controls fail to prevent its impact. Hypothetical scenario B Compromised build or release workflow Workflow weakness → Unauthorized build or publication → Artifact substitution → Potential production deployment Required conditions: The workflow weakness is exploitable, the attacker gains sufficient privileges, and release verification fails to stop the unauthorized artifact. Potential blast radius: - Customer-facing application functionality. - Data accessible to the application. - Production infrastructure reachable by compromised workloads. - Other repositories or environments sharing the same build credentials. Verification: Map actual dependency consumers, credentials, deployment roles, network boundaries, and shared infrastructure. None of these attack paths is confirmed by the test input. ## Phase 11: Remediation and Control Design Objective: Specify practical changes that reduce risk without causing unnecessary disruption. | Action | Priority | Verification | | ----------------------------------------------- | --------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------- | | Audit workflow permissions and release triggers | High investigation priority | Permission review and controlled workflow tests | | Run dependency vulnerability scans | High investigation priority | Review of findings and applicable fixes | | Verify artifact identity and provenance | High investigation priority | Successful policy-based verification | | Enforce approved package sources | Medium | Registry configuration review | | Generate release SBOMs | Medium | Compare SBOM components with release contents | | Review credentials and identity boundaries | High investigation priority | Access review and secret-scanning evidence | Implementation safeguards: - Test dependency upgrades against the existing regression suite. - Check compatibility before changing runtime or base-image versions. - Preserve a known-good release for rollback. - Do not disable security checks simply to make a build pass. - Require evidence of successful remediation before closing a finding. ## Phase 12: Security Validation and Regression Testing Objective: Verify that recommended controls work after implementation. | Test ID | Test | Expected result | | ------- | ---------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | | T-01 | Dependency resolution | Installation follows the approved lockfile and registry policy | | T-02 | Vulnerability scanning | Findings are triaged and applicable fixes are verified | | T-03 | SBOM validation | Component inventory matches the release artifact | | T-04 | Provenance verification | Artifact source and build identity satisfy policy | | T-05 | CI/CD permission review | Jobs have only necessary permissions | | T-06 | Secret exposure scan | No confirmed exposed credentials remain unaddressed | | T-07 | Image integrity check | Deployed digest matches the approved artifact | | T-08 | Application regression tests | Critical business functionality remains operational | | T-09 | Rollback test | A known-good release can be restored using the documented process | Test status: Proposed, not executed. No test is marked as passed because no repository access, test logs, scan reports, or deployment evidence was provided. ## Phase 13: Governance and Continuous Monitoring Objective: Make supply chain security an ongoing process. | Control | Owner role | Trigger | Expected evidence | | ---------------------- | ----------------------------- | ---------------------------------- | -------------------------------- | | Dependency monitoring | Application security engineer | New advisory or dependency update | Scan and triage record | | Package approval | Development lead | New dependency introduction | Approval and source record | | CI/CD access review | Platform engineer | Permission or workflow change | Reviewed configuration | | SBOM maintenance | Release engineer | New software release | Versioned SBOM | | Provenance enforcement | Platform security engineer | Artifact publication or deployment | Verified attestation | | Incident escalation | Security incident lead | Suspected compromise | Incident record and evidence log | Recommended cadence: Run automated checks on relevant code and dependency changes, and review access controls periodically according to project risk. Escalate confirmed critical exposures or suspected unauthorized releases through the organization's incident response process. ## Phase 14: Incident Response and Recovery Readiness Objective: Prepare for a suspected or confirmed supply chain compromise. Scenario 1: Suspicious dependency discovered 1. Preserve the lockfile, package metadata, build logs, and affected artifact digests. 2. Identify affected versions and releases. 3. Isolate the affected dependency or release where warranted. 4. Assess whether the component executed and what privileges it had. 5. Replace or upgrade the component using a verified source. 6. Rebuild, validate, and redeploy as appropriate. Scenario 2: Unauthorized artifact publication suspected 1. Restrict publication or deployment access as appropriate. 2. Preserve registry logs, attestations, and artifact metadata. 3. Compare the published digest with the approved build. 4. Determine whether the artifact reached production. 5. Revoke exposed credentials if evidence warrants it. 6. Restore a verified release and validate the recovery. Readiness gaps: Incident contacts, containment procedures, artifact quarantine, and recovery tests were not supplied. Important: Preserve forensic evidence where feasible before destructive cleanup. ## Phase 15: Implementation and Hardening Roadmap Objective: Convert the audit into an achievable sequence of improvements. Immediate: Establish the actual risk - Obtain repository and CI/CD configuration. - Run dependency and secret scans. - Verify production release permissions and artifact identity. Owner roles: Application security and platform engineering. Effort: Dependent on repository access and findings. Short term: Close verified control gaps - Fix confirmed high-impact vulnerabilities. - Enforce dependency source and version integrity policies. - Restrict workflow permissions and production deployment access. Completion evidence: Updated configuration, remediation records, and passing relevant validation tests. Medium term: Improve traceability - Automate SBOM generation. - Implement provenance attestations and artifact verification. - Improve build isolation and release approval controls. Completion evidence: Reproducible records linking approved source to verified release artifacts, where reproducible builds are required. Continuous: Maintain security - Monitor advisories and dependency changes. - Review CI/CD access and package sources. - Test incident recovery and rollback procedures. Completion evidence: Current monitoring records, reviewed exceptions, and documented recovery-test results. ## Phase 16: Final Software Supply Chain Risk Audit Report ### 1. Executive Summary - Project: Hypothetical Node.js and TypeScript e-commerce application. - Scope: Dependencies, package sources, CI/CD, containers, secrets, provenance, and production releases. - Main concern: The available information is insufficient to establish the actual security posture. - Most important next step: Collect technical evidence and verify dependency, pipeline, and artifact integrity controls. - Evidence limitation: No source repository, workflow YAML, scan results, SBOM, or deployment records were supplied. ### 2. Supply Chain Architecture Map ``` GitHub Repository | v npm Dependencies | v GitHub Actions | v Docker Image | v Artifact Registry | v Production Deployment ``` The artifact registry and exact deployment process are illustrative elements that must be verified. ### 3. Dependency Inventory and Graph - Direct dependencies: Unknown. - Transitive dependencies: Unknown. - Development and build-time dependencies: Unknown. - Docker base image: Unknown. - Third-party CI/CD actions: Unknown. - Lockfile presence: Stated in the test input; enforcement remains unverified. ### 4. Vulnerability and Exposure Register No specific vulnerability can be confirmed. Run a dependency scan, validate advisories, determine affected dependency paths, and assess runtime reachability. ### 5. Package Trust and Registry Risk Analysis Review registry configuration, lockfile integrity, private namespaces, package origins, and dependency update controls. No malicious package has been identified. ### 6. SBOM, Provenance and Traceability Audit SBOM generation, build attestations, signing, and release traceability remain unverified. Implement them according to the project's release requirements. ### 7. Build and CI/CD Integrity Audit Inspect workflow triggers, permissions, third-party action references, build isolation, release approvals, and deployment credentials. ### 8. Secrets, Identity and Permission Audit Review token scope, credential lifetime, secret exposure, and separation of duties. No credential compromise is established. ### 9. Container, Artifact and Release Integrity Verify the base-image digest, image provenance, registry permissions, approved artifact digest, and deployment integrity. ### 10. Risk Propagation and Blast Radius A compromised dependency or release pipeline could potentially affect production, but actual propagation depends on execution, permissions, network boundaries, and existing security controls. ### 11. Prioritized Risk Register | ID | Finding | Severity | Confidence | | ---- | -------------------------------- | ----------------- | ------------------------------- | | E-01 | Dependency exposure unknown | Unverified | High confidence in evidence gap | | E-02 | CI/CD permissions unknown | Unverified | High confidence in evidence gap | | E-03 | Artifact provenance unknown | Unverified | High confidence in evidence gap | | E-04 | Package source controls unknown | Unverified | High confidence in evidence gap | | E-05 | SBOM availability unknown | Informational gap | High confidence in evidence gap | | E-06 | Secret-handling controls unknown | Unverified | High confidence in evidence gap | These entries identify missing evidence, not confirmed security defects. Final severity must be assigned after technical investigation. ### 12. Remediation Plan - Obtain repository and pipeline evidence. - Run dependency, container, and secret scans. - Verify package source restrictions and lockfile enforcement. - Review CI/CD permissions and deployment identities. - Implement SBOM, provenance, and signature verification where appropriate. - Validate every remediation and document residual risk. ### 13. Security Validation and Regression Tests Execute the nine proposed tests from Phase 12. Record the actual results, evidence, failures, owners, and retest outcomes. Do not close findings based solely on configuration changes. ### 14. Governance and Continuous Monitoring Establish dependency approval, vulnerability triage, access reviews, SBOM lifecycle management, release verification, and incident escalation responsibilities. ### 15. Incident Response and Recovery Readiness Document procedures for suspicious packages, compromised credentials, unauthorized releases, artifact quarantine, verified rebuilds, and production recovery. Test rollback readiness. ### 16. Final Supply Chain Security Blueprint Highest-priority actions 1. Inspect the actual GitHub Actions workflows and production permissions. 2. Scan the complete dependency tree and Docker image for applicable vulnerabilities. 3. Establish trusted artifact identity and release provenance verification. Required verification evidence - Dependency scan results and lockfile. - Reviewed workflow permissions. - SBOM and provenance verification records, where implemented. - Approved and deployed artifact digests. - Regression and recovery test results. Residual risks: Unknown until the actual repository, build environment, and release process are assessed. ### 🛡️ Supply Chain Risk Verdict ## ⚪ Insufficient Evidence The available input identifies the software delivery architecture but does not provide enough technical evidence to determine whether the supply chain is secure, vulnerable, or compromised. Reason: No dependency scan, CI/CD configuration, SBOM, provenance evidence, or artifact verification results were supplied. Decision: Do not label the project secure or compromised. Collect evidence, assess actual exposure, and then assign risk severity. ## 🎯 Sample Test Evaluation This test demonstrates whether your prompt can: - Follow all 16 audit phases. - Separate confirmed facts, observations, inferences, and unknowns. - Prioritize risks without inventing CVEs or scan results. - Map potential attack paths and business impact. - Recommend actionable remediation and verification. - Produce a structured final report with a defensible verdict. Overall assessment: The prompt has strong audit coverage and explicit evidence-quality rules. Its real-world performance still needs to be tested using an actual repository, dependency files, CI/CD workflows, and scan evidence.