No -- two real problems here. 1. `script-src *` allows a script from ANY domain to run. It doesn't just permit your chart library, it permits an attacker who finds any injection point (a comment field, a compromised ad, a malicious redirect) to load their own script and run it with full page privileges. `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` is narrower but still lets an attacker who controls any injected HTML apply arbitrary styling-based attacks (e.g. clickjacking overlays, data exfiltration via CSS). 2. Your chart library URL has no pinned version, so `cdn.example.com/chart.js` can change its contents at any time without a corresponding change in your own codebase -- if that CDN account or its upstream package is ever compromised, the new file is trusted and runs automatically, with nothing in your git history to flag it. Fix: ``` Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' https://cdn.example.com/chart-4.4.2.min.js; style-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; ``` ```html <script src="https://cdn.example.com/chart-4.4.2.min.js" integrity="sha384-<hash-of-this-exact-file>" crossorigin="anonymous"></script> ``` Pin the exact version, add the SRI hash so a swapped file is rejected by the browser instead of silently executed, and drop `script-src *` down to only the hosts you actually use.