CURSOR AI CODE SECURITY GATE #### Scope - Reviewed: The supplied team-invitation route and described happy-path test. - Excluded: Session implementation, database schema, middleware, deployment, dependency manifest, and runtime traffic. - Evidence gaps: The session shape and any database-level tenant policy were not provided. #### Verdict: BLOCK RELEASE Reason: The route accepts tenant identity and privilege level from the request without a supported server-side authorization decision. #### Trust-boundary map Request body -> authenticated session -> no team-owner or admin decision -> membership creation with caller-selected role -> full member record returned. #### Findings F1 — CRITICAL — CONFIRMED — Caller controls tenant and role Evidence: `POST()` reads `teamId` and `role` from `req.json()` and passes both directly into `db.member.create()`; the visible route checks login only. Impact: Any authenticated caller reaching this route can attempt to create a membership in another team or assign a privileged role. Fix: Derive the acting user from the server session, verify that user can invite members to the selected team, and map the requested role through an explicit server-side allowlist before the write. Regression test: Call the route as a non-admin user with another team's id and an admin role; require a 403 response and verify that no membership is created. F2 — MEDIUM — CONFIRMED — Raw internal error returned Evidence: The catch block returns `error.message` in the HTTP response. Impact: Database or internal implementation details can be exposed to callers. Fix: Log a redacted internal error server-side and return a stable generic error code to the client. Regression test: Force a database failure; require a generic 500 response with no table, query, stack, or connection details. F3 — MEDIUM — CONFIRMED — Negative authorization tests missing Evidence: The supplied test description covers only an authorized owner invite. Impact: Cross-tenant and privilege-escalation regressions can merge undetected. Fix: Add non-admin, cross-tenant, invalid-role, and unauthenticated cases. Regression test: Run all four negative cases and require refusal with no write. #### Eight-check ledger - C1 Authentication and identity — CLEAN WITH LIMIT: A session is required, but session validation internals were not supplied. - C2 Authorization and tenant ownership — FINDING: F1. - C3 Input and execution boundary — FINDING: `teamId` and `role` reach the write without visible validation. - C4 Secret and configuration exposure — NOT APPLICABLE to the supplied code. - C5 Client/server enforcement parity — UNVERIFIED: No client code was supplied. - C6 Security control connectivity — UNVERIFIED: No middleware or policy helper was supplied. - C7 Dependency and supply-chain change — UNVERIFIED: No manifest or lockfile. - C8 Tests and failure behavior — FINDING: F2 and F3. #### Fix order 1. Add server-side team authorization and role allowlisting. 2. Add cross-tenant and privilege-escalation tests. 3. Replace raw error responses with a bounded client error. #### Limits This verdict covers only the supplied route and test description. It does not establish the security of the whole SaaS application. ---